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THE POTENTIAL USE OF POLLUTION INSURANCE AS 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY : AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 




Market-based environmental policies have been forwarded as alternatives to current pollution 
control policies.  Implementation of the "polluter pays" principle and governmental enforcement 
of pollution clean-up have led to astronomical environmental liabilities and clean-up costs, 
which may threaten the survival of many productive ventures, unless producers can spread 
pollution risk through insurance.  An emission constrained target MOTAD LP (TMLP) model 
showed that pollution insurance for irrigation farmers can be a feasible and efficient solution to 
agricultural salinization problems in the Loskop Valley, and fairly low salinity standards with 
pollution insurance will still be reconcilable with profitable farming. Pollution insurance 
appears to hold promise for applying the "polluter pays" principles also to non-point pollution. 
Site specific studies are needed for pollution policy, and more research is needed on pollution 
standards. 
 
SAMEVATTING : DIE POTENSIËLE GEBRUIK VAN BESOEDELINGSVER-
SEKERING AS OMGEWINGSBELEID : 'N EMPIRIESE ANALISE 
 
Markgebaseerde omgewingsbeleidsopsies was voorgehou as alternatief vir huidige 
besoedelingsbeheerbeleid. Toepassing van die "besoedelaar betaal" beginsel en owerheids-
afdwinging van besoedelingsopruiming het gelei tot astronomiese omgewingsaanspreeklikheid 
en opruimingskoste en dit kan die oorlewing van baie produksie-eenhede bedreig tensy 
produsente hul besoedelingsrisiko deur versekering kan versprei. 'n Emissie beperkende doelwit 
MOTAD LP model het getoon dat besoedelingsversekering vir besproeiingsboere 'n haalbare en 
doeltreffende oplossing vir landboukundige versoutingsprobleme in die Loskopvallei kan wees en 
dat redelik lae versoutingstandaarde tesame met besoedelingsversekering steeds met 
winsgewende boerdery versoenbaar sal wees. Dit lyk of besoedelingsversekering belofte toon vir 
die toepassing van "besoedelaar betaal" beginsels, ook by nie-punt besoedeling. Plek-spesifieke 
studies word vir besoedelingsbeleid benodig en meer navorsing oor besoedelingstandaarde is 




The failure of existing regulatory mechanisms to control environmental 
degradation satisfactorily has led to a fairly widespread call to employ market 
mechanisms for this purpose (Department of Environment, 1990; Kula, 1992; 
Moxey & White, 1994; Baumol & Oates, 1971; Pan & Hodge, 1994).  
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In this article a specific case is used to study pollution insurance as a potential 
market solution to environmental degradation. The question is whether one can 
protect society (as the third party) and the environment through mandatory 
pollution insurance.  This may potentially be economically the most efficient 
solution to pollution because it will rely on the market to arrive at the socially 
optimal level of environmental degradation. It aims to protect society or the 
environment, and also to protect producers and government from expensive 
pollution cleanup. As reality forces governments to make polluters pay for the 
clean-up of polluting emissions, astronomic environmental liabilities and clean-
up costs emerge (Steuber, 1989; Gilbert, 1992).  This will endanger many 
productive activities unless producers can spread this risk through insurance. 
Mandatory pollution insurance by all potential polluters is a possible approach. 
The feasibility of such a policy for irrigation farming was studied in the Loskop 
Valley 
 
2.  A THEORETICAL MODEL OF FERTILIZER POLLUTION CONTROL 
BY POLLUTION INSURANCE 
 
Mineralization of the Olifants River, caused by fertilizer, irrigation and 
cultivation practices was investigated.  Spatial differences in agriculture's 
potential to pollute surface and underground water stem from physical and 
chemical properties of the soil and underlying parent material.  Leaching of 
minerals often does not correlate particularly closely with fertilizer applications 
(Pan & Hodge, 1994). A catchment should therefore be divided into land classes 
and zones. Land classes define areas of homogeneous agricultural productivity 
with an uniform opportunity cost of pollution abatement. A zone refers to the 
spatial juxtaposition of areas relative to the hydrological system. Fertilizer salts 
move downstream, but not vice versa. The proportion of pollution generated 
upstream received downstream (the delivery ratio) varies between 0 and 1, 
according to the transportation mechanism and biochemical processes 
(Donigian, 1986). The profit function of firm i in zone j may be expressed as:   
 




  p is output price, 
 y ij is output and 
 c ij (yij, mij) is cost as a function of output and the mineralization level.  




The firm's cost function reflects both abatement (or pollution control) and 
production costs; mineralization increases with output.  The firm's benefit 
function is defined as (Xepapadeas, 1972): 
 
 B ij (mij) = max pij (yij, mij) = max [pyij - cij(yij, mij)] (2) 
           yij            yij 
 
This gives the maximum profit for a given level of mineralization (mij). Damage 
costs in zone j result from the mineral (salt) concentration which is determined 
by emissions from producers within the zone and emissions transported 
hydrologically from upstream: 
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 t kj  i s  t h e  d e l i v e r y  r a t i o  o f  e mi s s i o n s  r e ac h i n g  z o n e  j  f r o m  s o u r c e  
zone k, 
 h j  is the mineral concentrations as a function of emissions, and 
 d j  is the damage cost function. 
 
The delivery ratios tkj, are equal to 1 if k = j, 0 if zone k lies downstream of zone j, 
and between 0 and 1 if zone k is upstream of zone j. 
 
Society's objective should be reflected by environmental policies and 
environmental agencies (eg. The Department of Water Affairs (DWA)) and may 
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This maximizes the sum of producer profits less the sum of damage costs across 
all zones. 
 
The first order conditions for an optimal abatement policy, with convex benefit 






















 B ij (mij) is the first derivative of the benefit function and 
 D kj is the first partial derivative of damage in zone k with respect to 
emissions in zone j.  
 
Thus, the ratio of marginal private benefits between the two zones is equated 
with the ratio of marginal social costs. The marginal social cost from fertilizer 
pollution generated in zone 1 includes the damage in zone 1 plus the damage 
caused downstream in zone 2. The second term in the numerator on the right 
hand side is the partial derivative of the damage function in zone 2 due to 
emissions from zone 1. 
 
In downstream irrigation, the transfer of pollutants from upstream farms can be 
a major problem if farmers draw their water directly from the river. At Loskop, 
transfer among farmers is small; farmers receive water from the dam, not the 
river.  The delivery ratio still exceeds zero; pollutants are carried to adjacent 
farms by run-off and sub-terranean water movements.  If however, pollutant 
transfer to other water users downstream is considered, the effect is substantial 
because of return flow from farmers to the river. A situation that allows the 
actions of producer 1 to harm producer 2 through externalities presents 
problems. 
 
Damage functions for pollutants are usually not known.  With fertilizers, a 
maximum concentration level (in TDS) measured at one or more receptor 
points, may be specified as a proxy measure of the socially acceptable level of 
pollution.  The objective becomes one of maximising total producer profits 
subject to limits on TDS concentrations. 
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This approach is adopted for pollution insurance analysis in this study. This 
objective function does not alter previous conclusions regarding the efficiency of 
zonal emission premiums, taxes or quotas (Moxey & White, 1994). 
 





Target MOTAD linear programming (TMLP) was used to solve the above 
objective function. Features of the model and data are described briefly. 




3.1 Production  activities 
 
A survey revealed that land use patterns and enterprise combinations are fairly 
uniform at Loskop.  Some beef cattle were kept on natural grazing.  Farmers 
produced mainly the following crops under irrigation: tobacco, citrus, wheat, 
peas, groundnuts, soyabeans, other vegetables and cotton. 
 
Enterprise gross margins (cj) were determined for all enterprises. Data for gross 
income estimation were supplied by the Eastern Transvaal Co-operative (OTK). 
Yields at different fertilization levels were estimated from production functions 
fitted to data on fertilizer-yield responses in the area and the South African 




The main production resources levels (aij) necessary for the production of a unit 
activity and limits to their availability (bi) were based on findings from the field 
survey, and data from the OTK. 
 
3.2.1  Land, water and livestock 
 
Arable land per farm was constrained at 137 hectares, the average farm size as 
obtained from the OTK. These 137 hectares were available both for summer and 
winter crops, except if citrus orchards (perennial) were established. 
 
The usual irrigation water quota is 770 000 litres/ha/annum (equivalent to 770 
mm/annum), except when the water level at the dam is below normal. This led 
to an irrigation water constraint of 105 490 000 litres/ha/annum.  
 
Livestock was constrained at 56 livestock units (LSU); on average, farmers had 
395ha of natural grazing with a stocking rate of 1 LSU/7 ha. 
 
3.2.2 Minimum  constraint on income 
 
Pollution remediation or avoidance of production practices could cause 
reductions in farm income.  This was constrained to a total gross margin of 
greater than or equal to zero.  Over the short-run, a farmer will keep on 
producing, even at a loss, provided his gross farm income covers variable costs, 
as implied by zero total gross margin.  




3.2.3 Pollution remediation cost 
 
A pollution insurance premium (pollution remediation cost) was introduced in 
the model.  Assuming an actuarially fair pollution insurance scheme, the 
premium per kg of fertilizer applied was equated to the mean annual 
remediation cost stemming from such an application. This was estimated by 
assuming that increases in the TDS of the Olifants River (at a specified sampling 
point) to levels above salinity pollution (TDS) standards would be remedied by 
either dilution or reverse osmosis.  The data on river flow and TDS 
concentrations for 1981 to 1988 were obtained from the DWA data centre and 
those on remediation costs from the Rand Water Board. It varied between 5 and 
10c/m3 of river water using dilution, and between R2 and R2,50/m3 of river 




4.1 Basic  approach 
 
Optimum input-output decisions and their financial income were determined 
with and without pollution insurance, and compared thereafter, under the 
assumption of a uniform land use pattern for the valley. Average yields, inputs, 
revenues and costs of farmers in the Loskop Valley were used. The analysis 
used the IBM MPSX (Mathematical Programming System Extended) package. 
 
4.2  Estimation of the salinization indemnity (liability) charges to insurers 
 
The proposed pollution insurance scheme limits liability to the cost of pollution 
remediation. Future indemnity (liability) charges to insurers are projected from 
historical pollution statistics, and by determining mean charges, assuming a 
mandatory pollution insurance scheme.  
 
Mean pollution premium rates were based on the annual pollution remediation 
cost, depending on the level of water salinization, the remediation technique 
and the chosen pollution standard. Calculations were done for each year from 
1981 to 1988 by estimating the cost of diluting river water, using either water in 
the Loskop Dam, excess or overflow water from the dam, or water transfer from 
another catchment. This will require a network of water channels to connect the 
dams at the point of pollution in the river. Excess water will be returned to 
source after dilution. The unit dilution cost is made equal to the unit cost of 
irrigation water supply, and the total cost of remediation is equivalent to the 
cost of the total volume of water required for the dilution. The concentration of 




The volume of water required for the dilution of a given volume of water 
depends on the salinity concentration of both the water diluted, the water used 
for dilution, and on the salinity standard.  It was assumed that much of the 
dilution will be done with water from Loskop Dam.  A unit dilution cost of 
7,5c/m3 was assumed. The shortcoming of this assumption was overcome by a 
sensitivity analysis that determined the effect of variations in remediation cost 
on the optimal solution.  
 
In cases where the dilution technique could not be used for remediation, the per 
unit remediation cost of reverse osmosis, assumed to be R2,25/m3, was used 
and also varied in the sensitivity analysis. The cost of reverse osmosis depends 
on the volume of water to be treated and returned to the river. This depends on 
the salinity concentration and the salinity standard to be met.  
 
4.3 Salinity  pollution  standards 
 
Pollution standards have been established in South Africa (Government 
Gazette, 18 May, 1984) for effluent discharges from point sources. Special and 
general standards exist for various pollutants.  These standards were not 
applicable to the former homelands.  In addition, the implementation of 
pollution control measures (eg. mandatory pollution insurance) for non-point 
source pollution will require pollution standards for underground and surface 
water bodies from activities of non-point source polluters. Due to differences in 
water quality parameters in natural water bodies, these standards on salinity, 
pH, nitrates, phosphates, etc. - can be established in the form of allowable 
increments by non-point source pollution. A standard of no increments may 
alternatively be adopted.  This will require records of existing water quality 
parameters of underground and surface water over the whole country. Such 
record keeping will be more feasible (especially for groundwater) if restricted to 
regions with possible pollution problems.  
 
Under such standardization circumstances, and until agricultural science yields 
production technology equally productive, profitable and simultaneously less 
polluting, allowance will have to be made for some pollution of underground 
and surface water to the point where marginal loss equals marginal gain. Net 
social welfare is optimised at that point. The current extent of mineralization at 
Loskop, as indicated by TDS and chloride masses, is too high to be ignored for 
"business as usual". Optimization of social welfare will require pollution control. 
As basis, a salinity standard of 350 mg/l TDS was assumed for the Olifants 
River, lower than the 450 mg/l (or 70 ms/m electrical conductivity) standard 
required by domestic water users and some industrial water users (Department 




farmers and other non-point source polluters. Since such increases in natural 
water quality parameters imply some cost to the natural environment, this 
standard is hypothetical. The sensitivity analysis done with the salinity standard 
in mind also examined what the optimal farm plan would be, should a different 
pollution standard be  
 
4.4  Estimation of the pollution insurance premium (i.e. unit pollution 
remediation cost) 
 
In actuarial science, insurance premiums are estimated as a product of the 
probability of the occurrence of an event (normally estimated from historical 
data) and the indemnity charges associated with that occurrence. In this study, 
the important consideration is the probability of a unit remediation cost. In 1981, 
1987 and 1988, the mean annual salinity of the Olifants at the downstream 
sampling point indicates some increases in salinity, but this was within the 
salinity standard laid down (350mg/l TDS); this salinization would not require 
remediation.  Pollution remediation cost would be incurred in the remaining 
years, i.e. 1982-1986. Since premiums are estimated on the assumption of an 
actuarially fair insurance scheme, it is the mean pollution remediation cost 
which is considered, making it necessary to estimate mean annual pollution 
remediation cost for all 8 years studied.  
 
The premium rate was calculated per kg of fertilizer applied; producers using 
more fertilizer will thus pay higher premiums.  
 
This assumes fertilizer to be the only direct cause of salinity increases of the 
Olifants. However, an agricultural mineralization model derived for the Loskop 
Valley (Aihoon, 1994) indicates that other farming parameters, eg. land area 
cultivated to crops like tobacco and cotton as well as rainfall are also significant 
contributors. The linkage of fertilizer application to the premium payment is 
based on the assumption that increases in tillage and irrigation practices could 
be linked to increased fertilizer application. It implies that farming activities like 
groundnuts, soyabean and animal production that do not use fertilizer do not 
cause salinization.  This assumption may not be true.  However, salinization 
stemming from groundnut and soyabean tillage activities appears to be too 
small to be of significance (Aihoon, 1994).  Similar research elsewhere in the 
world also used fertilizer input, rather than leaching potential, as basis for the 
assessment of the pollution potential of different land use practices (Moxey & 
White, 1994; Pan & Hodge, 1994).  
 
The pollution insurance premium (i.e. the remediation cost per kg of fertilizer) 




of fertilizer was estimated for each year by dividing the total remediation cost 
by total fertilizer usage in the Loskop Valley. 
 
4.5 The  empirical  model 
 
A target MOTAD LP (TMLP) model incorporating an emission constraint factor 
was used to determine optimum farm plans for a representative farm.  An 
emission constraint was introduced in the form of the pollution remediation cost 
(per kg fertilizer).  Target-MOTAD allows a simultaneous analysis of the 
inclusion of income risk, pollution risk and a farm management objective of 
ensuring a minimum expected farm income that allows the farmer to break 
even. This approach was followed earlier by Swinton & Clark (1994). Moxey & 
White (1994) used an aggregate linear programming (ALP) model in their study 
of alternative policy instruments for nitrogen fertilizer pollution control. Pan & 
Hodge (1994) used a linear programming (LP) model similar to the standard 
crop-mix model formulated by Johnson et al. (1991) to estimate costs to farmers 
of policies that restrict nitrogen input or nitrate leaching.  
 
Numerous empirical studies have demonstrated that farmers are typically risk-
averse (Binswanger, 1980; Dillon & Scandizzo, 1978). They often prefer plans 
that provide a satisfactory level of security even if this means sacrificing income 
on average. In a risky world, a farm plan does not have a known income each 
year.  There are many possible income outcomes and, in the mathematical 
programming context, the actual outcome each year depends on the realized 
values of all the cj, aij, and bi coefficients in the model. All risks involving cj, aij, or 
bi coefficients translate into income risk. A single utility function U(Y), with Y as 
expected income, provides an integrated behavioural approach for selecting 
optimal farm plans.  
 
To many farmers, it may be an important farm planning target to at least break 
even or to cover at least all variable costs in the short-term. Tauer (1983) 
designed a target MOTAD linear programming model, including a pollutant 
emission constraint for this purpose. This model is mathematically formulated 
as follows (Hazell Norton, 1986): 
 
   maxE ij
j
X j =∑  (8) 
subject to  
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cjtX j Z =∑ − ≤0 all t  (9) 




  Σ pt Zt = l  (10) 
       t 
 
  Σ aij Xj ≤ bi,   all  i  (11) 
       j 
 
  Σ φj Xj - Σ Rj = 0   (12) 
       j     j 
 




 X j  =  the level of the jth farm activity.  Let n denote the number of 
possible activities, then j = 1 to n; 
 c j  =  the forecasted gross margin of a unit of the jth activity (Rand per 
-ha); 
 a ij  =  the quantity of the ith resource required to produce one unit of 
the jth activity. Let m denote the number of resources; then i = 1 
to m;   
 b i  =  the amount of the ith resource available; 
  φj  =  the pollution cost per ha for the production of the jth activity 
stemming from fertilizer application; and.  
 R j  =  the total pollution remediation cost (PRC) stemming from the 
production of the jth activity, the given pollution standard and 
the given remediation technology. 
 
The Z variables in equation (9) measure the value of deviations in income below 
the target. These deviations are collected in equation (10) and multiplied by the 
probability of them occurring (pt) to give the expected sum of the deviations 
below the target income. 
 
The model is set up to maximise E, (expected farm gross margin) subject to 
achieving a satisfactory level (determined by l) of compliance with the target 
income and the salinity pollution standard, which determines the level of the 
pollution remediation cost (PRC), i.e fj per unit activity.  
 
It was important to capture two aspects of farm planning in the model. If a 
premium is levied for every unit of fertilizer used, the profit-maximising level of 
fertilizer and yield changes.  To handle this, five points were chosen on the 




particular points and the corresponding fertilizer quantities entered the model 
as aij levels. 
 
The objective function included gross margins per hectare for the various levels 
of crop enterprises, the gross margin per LSU for beef cattle and the pollution 
remediation cost per kg of fertilizer.  
 
The constraint rows included limitations on the use of arable land, irrigation 
water requirements, the limit on beef cattle, fertilizer applications for crops, the 
expected short-fall from target income, and the risk rows.  The risk rows 
consisted of six years' historical gross margin data for the various enterprises, 
except beef cattle.  The total of enterprise gross margins was specified to be 
greater or equal to the target (zero). Beef cattle were not included in the income 
risk analysis because it does not compete with other enterprises, being produced 




The TMLP model yielded primal solutions and the `internal' sensitivity analyses 
obtained by activating the `Range' option in the MPSX package. This 'internal' 
sensitivity analysis provides information about the stability of the optimal 
solution.  Stability is tested ceteris paribus; the effect of change in a single 
coefficient is considered with all other coefficients held constant. 
 
The results are presented and discussed in two steps. The first step involves a 
comparison of optimum farm plans and revenues without and with pollution 
insurance. The second step involves `external' sensitivity analyses, in which 
values of some coefficients are varied in the model with pollution insurance. 
The purpose is to evaluate the effect of such changes on optimum results. 
 
5.1  Farm plans with and without of pollution insurance 
 
The target MOTAD LP model was run with and without pollution remediation 
cost (PRC). Results appear in Table 1.  
 
The primal solutions for the two scenarios indicated no change in optimum 
input-output use or in the level of resource application. The additional cost for 
pollution insurance reduced expected total gross margin by R45  237 from 
R1 282 751 to R1 237 514.  
 
Without PRC, the most efficient production plan involves keeping the 




all available land in summer (137 ha) to tobacco at its highest fertilizer-yield 
level considered, and to plant 116 ha in winter to peas at the highest considered 
fertilizer and yield level. According to the `internal' sensitivity analysis, water 
availability prevents planting more than that in winter. 
 
Table 1:  Optimal farm plans with and without pollution remediation cost 
(PRC) in the Loskop Valley - at a salinity standard of 350 mg/l 
TDS 
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The primal solution excluded citrus which, being a perennial enterprise, cannot 
compete with a combination of summer tobacco and winter peas, 
notwithstanding its high gross margin per hectare. Peas also have a relatively 
low water requirement. 
 
The stability of the primal solutions can be judged from the last two columns of 
Table 1. Upper and Lower costs indicate the range of activity gross margins over 
which the primal solution will remain unchanged. Beyond these limits, these 
activities would be replaced by the corresponding activities in the Limiting 
process (activity) column.  For example, if the gross margin of Tobacco 5 
becomes less than R5 533 it will be replaced by Citrus 5; a reduction of gross 
margin of Peas 5 to less than R2 424 will cause its replacement by Peas 4, i.e. 
peas with less fertilizer. 
 
The wide ranges between upper and lower costs indicate a high level of stability 
in the primal solution. The shadow prices of recoures indicate how much the 
farmer can pay for an extra unit of those resources that were exhausted by the 
primal solution. The farmer can pay up to R3 293 for an extra ha of arable land 
in summer and R7,77/mm/annum for extra water.  The situation remains 
almost unchanged with introduction of PRC.  
 
The introduction a pollution insurance premium (pollution remediation cost) of 
65 c/kg fertilizer usage did not cause a basis change in the primal solution; total 
fertilizer usage (69 596 kg) remains the same. This confirms previous findings 
(Babcock, 1992; Swinton & Clark, 1994) that under conditions of financial risk, 
risk aversion justifies heavy nitrogen fertilization.  The salinization effect of 
fertilizer usage is controlled by the remediation (i.e., clean-up) of the pollution 
insurance. The ‘internal’ sensitivity analysis (Table 1) shows that, should the 
premiums increase to R12,40/kg fertilizer, (almost 20 times the present cost), the 
basis would change, introducing Peas 1 (without fertilizer), reducing fertilizer 
usage by 25 619 kg. Extrapolating this to the whole Loskop Valley yields a total 
reduction of 4 956 248 kg per annum of fertilizer at Loskop. Such a reduction 
will reduce salinization in the Olifants, but will also have a social cost in the 
form of reduced income to farmers (R61 457 475 per annum less the value of the 
unused fertilizer). This may lead to a decline in agricultural employment in the 
region.  This illustrates the need for economic analysis of environmental 
degradation before new policies are adopted.  Since the social cost of 
externalities caused by salinization of the Olifants could be equally high (though 
not yet estimated), control of mineralization is necessary. However, regulations 
that cause fertilizer usage to decline drastically may be socially expensive. A 




remediation techniques suggested may be socially more desirable and deserves 
further investigation:  For example, what is the technical feasibility of these 
remediation techniques?   
 
Moreover, if such restrictive policies are adopted on a national scale, reduced 
s u p p l y  o f  s o m e  p r o d u c t s  m a y  i n d u c e  r i s i n g  f o o d  p r i c e s ,  t h e r e b y  i n d u c i n g  
additional social costs for the population.  This underlines the necessity of 
research on ways to control pollution as economically as possible. 
 
Insurance premium payments represent income transfers and not a social cost, 
while reduction in output caused by reductions in fertilizer use involves a social 
cost. If insurance would succeed to control salinization without reductions in 
output, it will represent an additional gain to society. It will be more attractive 
than environmental policy instruments like pollution tax, input quotas, 
pollution permits, etc., all of which reduce production to control pollution. 
There is a need to re-examine the traditional concept that pollution should be 
prevented rather than treated. This convention probably holds true with many 
forms of pollution because of the high externality costs and the irreversibility of 
effects. However, there is no scientific or economic justification to insist on this 
convention in cases where the pollutants are not harmful to the environment at 
the quantities of emission and where technically, remediation is relatively 
simple and cheap.  
 
Environmental degradation should be analyzed, diagnosed and addressed case 
by case. What is an efficient solution in one case may not be so in another, and 
vice versa.  
 
5.2 ‘External’  sensitivity  analysis of the optimal farm plan with pollution 
insurance 
 
The optimal farm plan with pollution insurance was subjected to sensitivity 
analysis in terms of pollution standards and cost of remediation technology. 
Results appear in Table 2. 
 
An arbitrary salinity standard has hitherto been used in the study. Pollution 
insurance as government policy will require research to determine standards 
that will ensure eco-efficiency in the management of natural resources. The first 
sensitivity analysis was aimed at the effect of different salinity standards on the 
optimal farm plan. Absolute non-pollution by non-point source polluters is one 
possibility that presently applies to point-source polluters.  For example, the 




that when these effluents mix with surface water, change in the quality of the 




Table 2:  Sensitivity of the optimal farm plan with pollution insurance to 
changes in various model coefficients 
 



















Osmosis - R3,32 
ii) 100%  increase 
in dilution cost 
- R1,30 
iii) 200%  increase 
in dilution cost 
- R1,95 
iv) 500%  increase 
in dilution cost 
- R3,90 
v) 1000%  increase 
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i) Zero  increases 





ii)  250 mg/l Tds - 
R1,50 by 
dilution 
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*  The variation in remediation cost was done assuming salinity pollution standard 
at 350 mg/l TDS 
**  The variation in irrigation water availability was done assuming salinity 
pollution standard at 350 mg/l TDS and PRC at 65 c/kg fertilizer usage 
@  Original results introduced for comparison 
 
that non-point source polluters, including agriculture, could alter the quality of 
underground and surface water without any limit because pollution cannot be 
legally traced to them.  




A policy that forbids non-point source pollution and asks non-point source 
polluters not to pollute at all will render reverse osmosis to be the only suitable 
technology for recovery of the salinity quality.  This will cost R15,36/kg of 
fertilizer usage and reduce total expected gross margin from R1 282 751 (in the 
absence of pollution insurance), to R289 589, thus a revenue loss of R993 162,32 
(77,4%) to the farmer.  With average annual financial commitments (including 
short, medium and long term liabilities, depreciation and operators earnings) 
currently estimated at R285  000 (University of Pretoria, 1993) this will cause 
financial ruin for many farmers, resulting in high social costs. Therefore, other 
salinity standards also have to be considered, eg 250 mg/l TDS, 450 mg/l TDS 
and the original 350 mg/l TDS. A requirement of zero increases in salinity would 
cause introduction of Peas 1 (no fertilizer) into the primal solution, reducing 
fertilizer application on the representative farm by 25 619 kg per annum. Such a 
policy might render it necessary for government to consider subsidization of 
pollution remediation cost (or pollution premiums).  Subsidization should 
however, be at a level just enough to allow profitable production, otherwise the 
cost to society could be high enough to negate the moderating effect on pollution 
(Swinton & Clark, 1994; Shortle & Laughland, 1994). 
 
The other salinity standards considered did not lead to basis changes in the primal 
solution, and led to moderate reductions in expected income. The final decision on 
salinity standard will have to depend on economic as well as ecological, social and 
other considerations. 
 
The effect of changes in the cost of the remediation technology adopted was also 
considered, once again assuming a salinity pollution standard of 350 mg/l TDS. 
Reverse osmosis was considered for a situation where water for dilution was not 
available from the Loskop Dam or any other source.  The other remediation 
technology costs considered were 100, 200, 500 or 1000 percent increases in the cost 
of dilution. A doubling in remediation costs would only have a moderate effect on 
expected income, which however becomes severely affected by further increases, 
including reverse osmosis.  
 
6.  IMPLEMENTATION OF A POLLUTION INSURANCE SCHEME 
 
Pollution insurance may potentially be used in the control of environmental 
degradation from both point and non-point sources. This study demonstrates that 
research into individual pollution cases creates the potential to apply pollution 
insurance pollution problems, including non-point source pollution.  Premium rate 
determination will require specific studies at the location of pollution, aimed at the 
polluters concerned. Implementation will require specific premiums for specific 




Some legal aspects that will need to be addressed:  Non-point source polluters 
should firstly also be made legally responsible for their actions under the "polluter 
pays" principle. This is achievable if a group of non-point source polluters at given 
definable location becomes jointly responsible. Responsibility should be linked to 
individuals' polluting actions. In the case of agricultural polluters, liability could be 
linked to the leaching or as in this analysis, to fertilizer usage. This will require 
determination of fertilizer usage by field.  
 
Experience elsewhere furthermore suggests that the insurance industry will be 
more willing to participate if their liability is limited to what is necessary to keep 
the environment clean. For example, like the EIL policies in the US, it could be 
made a claims-made-and-reported policy. This can eliminate the threat of long-
tailed claims, a major problem for the insurer. This form of policy requires a claim 
to be filed during the policy period, and reporting of the claim insured during the 
same policy period (Epstein et al., 1989). With non-point source pollution, such 
legal requirements could be modified to require the monitoring government 
agency (eg. DWA) to notify such claims directly to the insurer, and not the insured, 




Results of this analysis indicate that a market-based scheme to control agricultural 
pollution is possible and may be rather efficient.  The possibility to control 
agricultural mineralization problems, eg. in the Loskop Valley through a cost-
effective mechanism, means that the present non-action against non-point source 
polluters is unacceptable. 
 
Some widely held traditional concepts of environmental economics become 
questionable by the mere possibility of this study. Is the notion that prevention or 
control of non-point pollution is possible only through regulation and policing a 
mistake of generalization?  Is the notion wrong that because non-point source 
pollution liabilities cannot be sourced to individual polluters, the "polluter pays" 
principle cannot be applied?  Is the notion also a mistake of generalization that 
once a water body is polluted the pollution cannot be remedied? These questions 
can only be answered by research; some methodologies adopted in this study may 
be useful in research on other non-point source pollution problems. 
 
If a standard of zero increases in river salinity becomes government policy, it will 
lead to very expensive pollution control and many insolvencies.  A salinity 
pollution standard that provides for some level of non-point salinization will still 
allow profitable operation of farms, together with a pollution insurance scheme. 




Thus, while the option of non-point source pollution control via remediation (or 
cleaning) is not feasible at the individual polluter level, the pollution insurance 
scheme makes it feasible for a group of farmers in a subcatchment, because of the 
economies of scale involved in large-scale pollution remediation.  This makes 
possible a market-based, economically efficient pollution control measure that 
maximizes net social gain and welfare.  Pollution remediation which does not 
require cuts in production then becomes an alternative mechanism to all others 
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